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Abstract. In Part I of this paper, we presented a Hilbert-style system
ΣD axiomatizing of stit logic of justification announcements (JA-STIT)
interpreted over models with discrete time structure. In this part, we prove
three frame definability results for ΣD using three different definitions of a
frame plus a yet another version of completeness result.
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1 Introduction
The so-called stit logic of justification announcements (JA-STIT, for short) was
introduced in [6] as an explicit fragment of the richer logic of E-notions introduced in
[8]. The underlying idea was to interpret the proving activity as an activity that results
in presenting (or, as it were, demonstrating) proofs to the community thus making
them publicly available within this community. JA-STIT borrows the representation
of proofs which get presented to the community in this way from justification logic
by S. Artemov et al. [2], whereas the model for the agentive activities within the
community is based on stit logic by N. Belnap et al. [4]. Both of these logics are
imported into JA-STIT rather explicitly, which leads to the presence of a full set of
their respective modalities in the JA-STIT language. In a similar fashion, the intended
models for JA-STIT contain the full set of structural elements present in the models
for both justification logic and stit logic.
The interaction between agents and proofs is then provided for by a common pool
of proofs publicly announced within the community. This model for justification an-
nouncements is inspired by a rather common occurrence when a group of agents tries
to produce a proof working on a shared whiteboard. In JA-STIT this situation is
modelled in an idealized form, so that one abstracts away from (1) the other available
media (like private notes, private messages, etc.), (2) the natural limitations of the ac-
tual whiteboard (like limited space and the necessity to erase old proofs), and (3) from
the natural limitations of the agents’ communication capacities (like bad handwriting
on the part of presenting agents or short-sightedness on the part of spectators).
1
2 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
The state of the common body of publicly presented proofs, or of the community
whiteboard, as we will sometimes call it, is described in JA-STIT by modality Et, where
t is an arbitrary proof polynomial of justification logic. The informal interpretation of
Et is that the proof t is presented to the community, or that t is on the whiteboard.
This reading also explains the choice of E as notation for this modality, since it serves
as a sort of existence predicate for the pool of proofs publicly announced within the
community.
The axiomatization of JA-STIT w.r.t. the full class of its intended models was given
in [6] in the form of Hilbert-style axiomatic system Σ. At the same time, Proposition 1
of [6] showed that, rather surprisingly, this axiomatization is sensitive to the temporal
structure of the underlying models, even though neither stit logic, nor justification logic,
nor else Et-modality seem to be relevant to temporal logic, and the standard temporal
modalities prove undefinable within JA-STIT. Nevertheless, it turned out that once
the class of underlying models is restricted to the models based on discrete time, the
axiomatization is no longer complete. The first part of this paper focuses on finding
a strongly complete axiomatization ΣD of JA-STIT over the subclass of its intended
models which are based on discrete time. We also found a number of less restrictive
classes of models in the process — which all induce the same set of validities as the
models with discrete temporal substructure. This result shows that one cannot enforce
a discrete temporal substructure onto a model by simply postulating an appropriate set
of JA-STIT validities. A natural follow-up question then presents itself, namely, how
much of a structure can be enforced on the underlying model by simply postulating
the set of theorems of ΣD. Given that JA-STIT is a variant of modal propositional
logic, it is more productive to recast this question in terms of frame definability rather
than model definability. In this way, we ask:
Main question. Assuming all the theorems of ΣD are valid over the class
of models based on a given frame F , what can be said about F itself?
The exact meaning of this question clearly depends on how we define the notion of
a frame on which a given model is based. Indeed, if we are primarily interested in what
our axiomatization has to say about temporal sub-structure of the underlying frame, we
need to include at least the set of moments woven together by a temporal accessibility
relation. This gives us what we call a temporal frame; but we will show below that the
restriction on the class of frames induced by the set of ΣD theorems is not affected at
all if we also add the choice function to the frame structure thus extending a temporal
frame to a stit frame. By contrast, the situation changes dramatically if we further
add to a stit frame the epistemic accessibility relations as these can interact with the
stit substructure of the frame in most intricate and subtle ways. In this way we obtain
a justification stit frame and another frame definability theorem which is very different
from the similar results for temporal and stit frames.
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define the language
and the semantics of the logic at hand. We then define the three versions of the frame
notion mentioned in the previous paragraph and consider some natural subclasses in
both frame types relevant to the main part of the paper (these will appear in the results
presented in Section 3). Next, we recall the definition of ΣD and recapitulate, without
a proof, some results from Part I to be used in this second part as well.
Section 3 proves the frame definability results for the three versions of a frame
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notion. Additionally, we identify yet another class of models w.r.t. which our axiom-
atization is complete, this time using the notion of justification stit frame. Section 4
gives some conclusions and drafts directions for future work.
In what follows we will be assuming, due to space limitations, a basic acquaintance
with both stit logic and justification logic. We refer the readers to [1] for a quick
introduction into the basics of stit logic, and [5, Ch. 2] for the same w.r.t. justification
logic.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic definitions and notation
We fix some preliminaries. First we choose a finite set Ag disjoint from all the
other sets to be defined below. Individual agents from this set will be denoted by
letters i and j. Then we fix countably infinite sets PV ar of proof variables (denoted
by x, y, z) and PConst of proof constants (denoted by c, d). When needed, subscripts
and superscripts will be used with the above notations or any other notations to be
introduced in this paper. Set Pol of proof polynomials is then defined by the following
BNF:
t := x | c | s+ t | s× t |!t,
with x ∈ PV ar, c ∈ PConst, and s, t ranging over elements of Pol. In the above
definition + stands for the sum of proofs, × denotes application of its left argument to
the right one, and ! denotes the so-called proof-checker, so that !t checks the correctness
of proof t.
In order to define the set FormAg of formulas we fix a countably infinite set V ar
of propositional variables to be denoted by letters p, q. Formulas themselves will be
denoted by letters A,B,C,D, and the definition of FormAg is supplied by the following
BNF:
A := p | A ∧B | ¬A | [j]A | ✷A | t:A | KA | Et,
with p ∈ V ar, j ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol.
It is clear from the above definition of FormAg that we are considering a version of
modal propositional language. As for the informal interpretations of modalities, [j]A
is the so-called cstit action modality and ✷ is the historical necessity modality, both
modalities are borrowed from stit logic. The next two modalities, KA and t:A, come
from justification logic and the latter is interpreted as “t proves A”, whereas the former
is the strong epistemic modality “A is known”.
We assume ✸ as notation for the dual modality of ✷. As usual, ω will denote the
set of natural numbers including 0, ordered in the natural way.
For the language at hand, we assume the following semantics. A justification stit
(jstit) model for Ag is a structure
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
such that:
1. Tree is a non-empty set. Elements of Tree are called moments.
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2. ✂ is a partial order on Tree for which a temporal interpretation is assumed. We
will also freely use notations like ☎, ✁, and ✄ to denote the inverse relation and
the irreflexive companions.1
3. Hist is a set of maximal chains in Tree w.r.t. ✂. Since Hist is completely
determined by Tree and ✂, it is not included into the structure of model as a
separate component. Elements of Hist are called histories. The set of histories
containing a given moment m will be denoted Hm. The following set:
MH(M) = {(m,h) | m ∈ Tree, h ∈ Hm},
called the set of moment-history pairs, will be used to evaluate formulas of the
above language.
4. Choice is a function mapping Tree × Ag into 22
Hist
in such a way that for any
given j ∈ Ag and m ∈ Tree we have as Choice(m, j) (to be denoted as Choicemj
below) a partition of Hm. For a given h ∈ Hm we will denote by Choicemj (h) the
element of partition Choicemj containing h.
5. Act is a function mapping MH(M) into 2Pol.
6. R and Re are two pre-order on Tree giving two versions of epistemic accessibility
relation. They are assumed to be connected by the inclusion R ⊆ Re.
7. E is a function mapping Tree×Pol into 2Form called admissible evidence function.
8. V is an evaluation function, mapping the set V ar into 2MH(M).
Furthermore, a jstit model has to satisfy a number of additional constraints. In
order to facilitate their exposition, we introduce a couple of useful notations first. For
a given m ∈ Tree and any given h, g ∈ Hm we stipulate that:
Actm :=
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h),
and:
h ≈m g ⇔ (∃m
′
✄m)(h, g ∈ Hm′).
Whenever we have h ≈m g, we say that h and g are undivided at m.
The list of constraints on jstit models then looks as follows:
1. Historical connection:
(∀m,m1 ∈ Tree)(∃m2 ∈ Tree)(m2 ✂m ∧m2 ✂m1).
2. No backward branching:
(∀m,m1,m2 ∈ Tree)((m1 ✂m ∧m2 ✂m)⇒ (m1 ✂m2 ∨m2 ✂m1)).
1A more common notation ≤ is not convenient for us since we also widely use ≤ in this paper to
denote the natural order relation between elements of ω.
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3. No choice between undivided histories:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(h ≈m h
′ ⇒ Choicemj (h) = Choice
m
j (h
′))
for every j ∈ Ag.
4. Independence of agents:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀f : Ag → 2Hm)((∀j ∈ Ag)(f(j) ∈ Choicemj )⇒
⋂
j∈Ag
f(j) 6= ∅).
5. Monotonicity of evidence:
(∀t ∈ Pol)(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)⇒ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m′, t)).
6. Evidence closure properties. For arbitrarym ∈ Tree, s, t ∈ Pol and A,B ∈ Form
it is assumed that:
(a) A→ B ∈ E(m, s) ∧ A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ B ∈ E(m, s× t);
(b) E(m, s) ∪ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m, s+ t).
(c) A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ t : A ∈ E(m, !t);
7. Expansion of presented proofs:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(m′ ✁m⇒ ∀h ∈ Hm(Act(m
′, h) ⊆ Act(m,h))).
8. No new proofs guaranteed:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(Actm ⊆
⋃
m′✁m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h))).
9. Presenting a new proof makes histories divide:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(h ≈m h
′ ⇒ (Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′))).
10. Future always matters:
✂ ⊆ R.
11. Presented proofs are epistemically transparent:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)⇒ (Actm ⊆ Actm′)).
The components like Tree, ✂, Choice and V are inherited from stit logic, whereasR, Re
and E come from justification logic. The only new component is Act which represents
the above-mentioned common pool of proofs demonstrated to the community or the
state of the community whiteboard at any given moment under a given history. When
interpreting Act, we invoke the classical stit distinction between dynamic (agentive)
and static (moment-determinate) entities, assuming that the presence of a given proof
polynomial t on the community whiteboard only becomes an accomplished fact at m
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when t is present in Act(m,h) for every h ∈ Hm. On the other hand, if t is in Act(m,h)
only for some h ∈ Hm this means that t is rather in a dynamic state of being presented,
rather than being present, to the community.
Due to space limitations, we skip the explanation of the intuitions behind jstit
models. The interested reader may find such an explanation either in Section 2 of Part
I of this paper, or in [7, Section 3].
For the members of FormAg , we will assume the following inductively defined
satisfaction relation. For every jstit model M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
and for every (m,h) ∈MH(M) we stipulate that:
M,m, h |= p⇔ (m,h) ∈ V (p);
M,m, h |= [j]A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Choicemj (h))(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= ✷A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Hm)(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= KA⇔ ∀m′∀h′(R(m,m′)&h′ ∈ Hm′ ⇒M,m
′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= t:A⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&(∀m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)&h′ ∈ Hm′ ⇒M,m
′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= Et⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h).
In the above clauses we assume that p ∈ V ar; we also assume standard clauses for
Boolean connectives.
2.2 Frames and their subclasses
In a modal propositional context, it is customary to consider frames alongside
models, and frames are normally defined as reducts of the models to components not
involving any linguistic entities. In this way, within the classical modal logic a frame
is a model minus the evaluation for propositional variables. Thus, in stit logic, a frame
will contain Tree, ✂ and Choice but omit V . In pure justification logic the situation
is slightly more complicated, since also the admissible evidence function E invokes
polynomials and sets of formulas. Therefore, in [2] a justification frame is just a set
of worlds pre-ordered by the two epistemic accessibility relations; it does not contain
E which will rather be construed as a part of a model based on this frame. When we
turn to jstit models, we find Act as a further language-dependent component. Even
though one can argue that with Act we enter a sort of grey area as compared to E ,
since Act invokes proof polynomials but not formulas, in the context of JA-STIT it
is clear that Act must be outside of frame structure. Indeed, one of the traditional
distinctions between frames and models would be that one can evaluate formulas of a
given language in models but not in frames. An exception is made for 0-ary connectives
like ⊥ and ⊤ and the formulas built from these connectives. Now, within the context
of JA-STIT one can evaluate every formula of the form Et for t ∈ Pol using Act alone,
and it would be tough to argue that such formulas are just another example of 0-ary
connectives.
Having these considerations in mind, we define our frame notions as follows. If
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 is a jstit model forAg, then F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, R,Re〉
is a justification stit (or jstit, for short) frame for Ag, andM is said to be based on F .
Similarly, we define that C = 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉 (resp. T = 〈Tree,✂〉) is a stit frame
(resp. temporal frame) for Ag. In this case, both M and F as defined above are said
to be based on C (resp. T ). Given a class F of jstit (resp. stit, temporal) frames, we
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will denote the class of jstit models based on the frames from F by Mod(F). We also
observe, that notations like Hist(F ) and MH(F ) still make perfect sense when F is a
jstit, stit, or temporal frame.
An important subsclass of jstit frames is made up of what we will call unirelational
jstit frames. These are the frames satisfying the additional constraint that Re ⊆ R.
It is known (see [2]) that switching from the full class of models to the unirelational
models (that is to say, to the models based on unirelational frames) in the context of
pure justification logic still leaves us with a class of models w.r.t. which the logic is
complete. We have shown (in [6]) that the same holds for JA-STIT over the general
class of models and (in Part I of this paper) that the situation does not change when
one restricts attention to the models based on any class of stit frames considered in
Part I of this paper. In this second part, we will also show that this observation holds
good for the class of models based on regular jstit frames. Whenever F is a class of jstit
frames, we will denote {F ∈ F | F is unirelational} by F ↓. Similarly, whenever C is
a class of stit or temporal frames we will denote by Mod↓(C) the class of unirelational
jstit models based on frames from C.
Before we move on, we need to introduce the notation for an immediate ✁-successor
of a given moment as it will play an important part in the frame restrictions to be
considered below. So whenever C = 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉 is a stit frame andm,m′ ∈ Tree,
we set that:
Next(m,m′)⇔ (m✁m′&(∀m′′ ✁m′)(m′′ ✂m)).
We now remind the reader the definition of a mixed successor stit frame originally
given in Part I:
Definition 1. Let C = 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉 be a stit frame. Then we say that C is a
mixed successor frame iff for all m,m1 ∈ Tree it is true that:
[m✁m1 ⇒ (∃m2 ✂m1)(Next(m,m2))] ∨ [(∀h, g ∈ Hm)(h ≈m g)] (mixsucc)
We will denote the class of mixed successor stit frames by Cmixsucc, and the same
class restricted to the stit frames for a given community Ag by CAgmixsucc. Since condition
(mixsucc) does not invoke Choice function of a stit frame, it makes perfect sense for
temporal frames as well. Therefore, we will denote by Tmixsucc the class of mixed
successor temporal frames and by T Agmixsucc the class of such frames for Ag.
We now proceed to defining the restriction used in our jstit frame definability result.
First we need one further technical notion:
Definition 2. Let F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, R,Re〉 be a jstit frame and let m ∈ Tree. We
define Θm ⊆ 22
Tree
setting that S ⊆ Tree is in Θm iff all of the following conditions
hold:
1. m ∈ S;
2. (∀m1,m2 ∈ Tree)((m1 ∈ S&Re(m1,m2))⇒ m2 ∈ S);
3. (∀m1 ∈ Tree)[(∀h ∈ Hm1)(∃m2 ∈ h)(Next(m1,m2)&m2 ∈ S)⇒ m1 ∈ S];
4. (∀m1 ∈ Tree)([m1 ∈ S&(∀m2✁m1)∃m3(m2✁m3✁m1)]⇒ (∃m4✁m1)(m4 ∈ S)).
We give one important consequence of the above definition as a lemma:
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Lemma 1. Let F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, R,Re〉 be a jstit frame, let m ∈ Tree, and let
S ∈ Θm. Then:
(∀m0 ∈ Tree)(m0 ∈ S ⇒ (∃m1 ∈ Tree)(m1 ✁m0)).
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that m0 ∈ S but there is no moment m1 such that
m1 ✁m0. Then, by contraposition of Definition 2.4, we must have that:
¬(∀m2 ✁m0)∃m3(m2 ✁m3 ✁m0),
whence, pushing the negation inside, we get that:
(∃m2 ✁m0)∀m3(m2 ✁m3 ⇒ ¬m3 ✁m0).
In particular, for any such m2 we will have m2 ✁m0 and thus we have got our contra-
diction in place.
Lemma 1 shows that for a given m ∈ Tree the family Θm may end up being empty,
for example, when we have Re(m,m
′) and m′ is the ✂-least moment in Tree. On the
other hand, in case when Tree has no ✂-least moment, Θm is always non-empty, since
we will have Tree ∈ Θm for all moments m. However, within this paper we will be
mostly interested in less trivial configurations of Θm families:
Definition 3. Let F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, R,Re〉 be a jstit frame. Then we say that F
is regular iff the following holds for all m,m1 ∈ Tree:
{m✁m1&(∃S ∈
⋂
m✁m0✂m1
Θm0)(m /∈ S&
&(∃h′ ∈ Hm)((∀g ∈ Hm1)(h
′ 6≈m g)&(∀m
′ ∈ h′)[Next(m,m′)⇒ m′ /∈ S])} ⇒
⇒ (∃m2 ✂m1)(Next(m,m2)) (reg)
Just as with the (mixsucc) restriction on stit frames, we introduce the notation
Freg for the class of regular jstit frames and the notation FAgreg for the class of regular
jstit frames for a given agent community Ag.
Before we move on to actually proving something, we mention a couple of technical
lemmas which were proved in Part I and will be used here without a proof:
Lemma 2. Let C = 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉 be a stit frame. Then:
1. (∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h ∈ Hm)(∃m′(m′ ✄m)⇒ (∃m′′ ✄m)(h ∈ Hm′′));
2. (∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(m✂m′ ⇒ Hm′ ⊆ Hm);
3. ≈m is an equivalence relation for every m ∈ Tree.
Lemma 3. Let M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 be a jstit model. Then:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(∀h ∈ Hm′)(∀t ∈ Pol)(m✁m
′&t ∈ Act(m,h′)⇒ t ∈ Actm′).
We now establish a connection between the above-defined classes of stit and jstit
frames:
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Lemma 4. Let Ag be a community of agents, let F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re〉
be a jstit frame for Ag, and let C be its reduct to stit frame. Then all of the following
statements are true:
1. If C ∈ CAgmixsucc, then F ∈ F
Ag
reg;
2. It is possible that F ∈ FAgreg but C /∈ C
Ag
mixsucc.
Proof. (Part 1) Assume that C ∈ CAgmixsucc; we show that F ∈ F
Ag
reg. Indeed, assume
that m,m1 ∈ Tree, h′ ∈ Hm, and S ⊆ Tree verify the antecedent of (reg). This
implies, among other things that:
m✁m1&(∀g ∈ Hm1)(h
′ 6≈m g). (1)
Now, choose any h ∈ Hm1 . By Lemma 2.2, we get that h ∈ Hm, and, by the second
conjunct of (1), we obtain that h 6≈m h′ thus falsifying the second disjunct in the
condition (mixsucc) for m,m1. Therefore, the first disjunct of the same condition
must hold, whereby, given that m ✁ m1, we get that (∃m2 ✂ m1)(Next(m,m2)), as
desired.
As for Part 2, consider a jstit frame F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re〉 such that C
is outside CAgmixsucc and R = Re = Tree× Tree. With these settings we will have:
Θm =
{
∅, if there is a ✂-least element in Tree;
{Tree}, otherwise.
for all m ∈ Tree. By Definition 2.2, therefore, the second conjunct in the antecedent
of (reg) will be trivially falsified. This means that F ∈ FAgreg, as desired.
Next we recall the definition of the Hilbert-style axiomatic system ΣD from Part
I. We first fix an arbitrary agent community Ag (and will keep it fixed till Section 4).
The set of axiom schemes for ΣD then looks as follows:
A full set of axioms for classical propositional logic (A0)
S5 axioms for ✷ and [j] for every j ∈ Ag (A1)
✷A→ [j]A for every j ∈ Ag (A2)
(✸[j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧✸[jn]An)→ ✸([j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [jn]An) (A3)
(s:(A→ B)→ (t:A→ (s× t):B) (A4)
t:A→ (!t:(t:A) ∧KA) (A5)
(s:A ∨ t:A)→ (s+ t):A (A6)
S4 axioms for K (A7)
KA→ ✷K✷A (A8)
✷Et→ K✷Et (A9)
The assumption is that in (A3) j1, . . . , jn are pairwise different.
The rules of inferences are then as follows:
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From A,A→ B infer B; (R1)
From A infer KA; (R2)
From KA→ (¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etn ∨ ✷Es1 ∨ . . . ∨ ✷Esk)
infer ⇒ KA→ (¬Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Etn ∨Es1 ∨ . . . ∨ Esk). (RD)
ΣD is a minimal system in which we make no assumptions as to the properties of
proof constants. One standard way to extend this minimal system (following a pattern
established in the pure justification logic) is to add a number of assumptions about
proof constants. More precisely, let us call a constant specification any set CS such
that:
• CS ⊆ {cn : . . . c1 :A | c1, . . . , cn ∈ PConst, A an instance of (A0)− (A9)};
• Whenever cn+1 :cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS, then also cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS.
For a given constant specification, we can define the corresponding inference rule RCS
as follows:
If cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS, infer cn : . . . c1 :A. (RCS)
We now define that ΣD(CS) is just ΣD extended with the rule (RCS). Since ∅ is
clearly one example of constant specification, we have that ΣD(∅) = ΣD so that our
initial axiomatic system is also in the class of systems of the form ΣD(CS). However,
when CS 6= ∅, the corresponding system ΣD(CS) will prove some formulas which are
not valid even if we restrict our attention to jstit models based on any class of frames
defined in Section 2. We therefore have to describe the restriction on jstit models which
comes with a commitment to a given CS. We say that a jstit model M is CS-normal
iff it is true that:
(∀c ∈ PConst)(∀m ∈ Tree)({A | c:A ∈ CS} ⊆ E(m, c)),
where E is theM’s admissible evidence function. Again, it is easy to see that the class
of ∅-normal jstit models is just the whole class of jstit models so that the representation
ΣD(∅) = ΣD does not place any additional restrictions on the class of intended models
of ΣD. Whenever F is a class of frames, jstit or stit, we will denote the class of
CS-normal jstit models based on the frames from F by ModCS(F).
We then define a proof in ΣD(CS) as a finite sequence of formulas such that
every formula in it is either an axiom or is obtained from earlier elements of the
sequence by one of inference rules. A proof is a proof of its last formula. If an
A ∈ FormAg is provable in ΣD(CS), we will write ⊢CS A. We say that Γ ⊆ FormAg
is inconsistent in ΣD(CS) (or CS-inconsistent) iff for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we have
⊢CS (A1∧ . . .∧An)→ ⊥, and we say that Γ is consistent in ΣD(CS) (or CS-consistent)
iff it is not inconsistent in ΣD(CS).
Finally, we cite (in a somewhat weakened form) the main result of Part I, which we
will use in this part without a proof:
Theorem 1. Let Γ ⊆ FormAg. Then Γ is CS-consistent iff it is satisfiable inModCS(C
Ag
mixsucc)
iff it is satisfiable in Mod↓CS(C
Ag
mixsucc).
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We can immediately state a similar completeness result for the temporal frames:
Corollary 1. Let Γ ⊆ FormAg . Then Γ is CS-consistent iff it is satisfiable in
ModCS(T
Ag
mixsucc) iff it is satisfiable in Mod
↓
CS(T
Ag
mixsucc).
Proof. Note that M is a (unirelational) jstit model based on a frame from CAgmixsucc iff
M is a (unirelational) jstit model based on a frame from T Agmixsucc.
3 Frame definability results
3.1 Temporal and stit frames
We deal with the stit frames first. The principal lemma looks as follows:
Lemma 5. Let CS be a constant specification and let C = 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉 be a stit
frame outside CAgmixsucc. Then there is a CS-normal jstit modelM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
based on C such that for some (m,h) ∈MH(M) it is true that:
M,m, h 6|= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey)→ (Ex ∨ ¬Ey).
Proof. Assume that C /∈ CAgmixsucc. Then we can choosem0,m1 ∈ Tree and h0, h1 ∈ Hm0
such that:
(h0 6≈m0 h1)&(m0 ✁m1)&(∀m✂m1)(¬Next(m0,m)). (2)
We now extend C to M setting R = Re = ✂, E(m, t) = Form
Ag for all m ∈ Tree
and t ∈ Pol, and setting V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ V ar. As for Act, we set as follows. We
first choose an arbitrary h2 ∈ Hm1 . By Lemma 2.2 we know that also h2 ∈ Hm0 . Now
for an arbitrary m ∈ Tree we define that:
Act(m,h) =


{y}, if m = m0 and h ≈m0 h2;
{x, y}, if m✄m0 and h ≈m0 h2;
∅, otherwise.
It is obvious that every semantical constraint on jstit models is satisfied, except possibly
for the constraints invoking Act, and it is also clear that such an M satisfies CS-
normality condition for every constant possible specification CS.
As for Act itself, we start by establishing the following:
Claim. Under the current settings for M we have, for an arbitrary m ∈ Tree:
Actm =
{
{x, y}, (∃h ∈ Hm)(m✄m0&h ≈m0 h2);
∅, otherwise.
Indeed, assume that m ∈ Tree and h ∈ Hm are such that m ✄ m0 and h ≈m0 h2.
Now, if g ∈ Hm is arbitrary, then, by Lemma 2.2, g, h ∈ Hm0 so that g ≈m0 h. By
Lemma 2.3, we get then g ≈m0 h2 so that Act(m, g) = {x, y}. Since g ∈ Hm was
chosen arbitrarily, this means that also Actm = {x, y}.
On the other hand, if either m0 5 m or no history in Hm is undivided from h2
at m0, then we obviously have Actm = ∅. Assume then that m = m0. Recall that
h0, h1 ∈ Hm0 = Hm are such that h0 6≈m0 h1. Therefore, by Lemma 2.3, we must have
12 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
either h0 6≈m0 h2 or h1 6≈m0 h2, whence either Act(m0, h0) or Act(m0, h1) equals to ∅.
In any case, we will have ∅ = Actm0 = Actm.
We now look into the semantical constraints dependent on Act in some detail.
Expansion of presented proofs. Assume that m✁m′ and that h ∈ Hm′ . Then
also h ∈ Hm by Lemma 2.2. Now, if m0 5 m, then Act(m,h) = ∅ and the constraint
is verified trivially. The same argument applies, if h 6≈m0 h2. Further, if m = m0 and
h ≈m0 h2, then we must have Act(m,h) = {y} and Act(m
′, h) = {x, y}, respectively,
and the constraint is satisfied. Finally, if m ✄m0 and h ≈m0 h2, then we must have
Act(m,h) = Act(m′, h) = {x, y}, and the constraint is again satisfied.
Presenting a new proof makes histories divide. Assume that m ∈ Tree
and that h ≈m g, so that for some m′ ✄ m it is true that m′ ∈ h ∩ g. Now, if
m0 5 m, then Act(m,h) = Act(m, g) = ∅ and the constraint is verified. The same
argument applies when h, g 6≈m0 h2. Finally, if m0 ✂m and h, g ≈m0 h2, then either
Act(m,h) = Act(m, g) = {y} or Act(m,h) = Act(m, g) = {x, y} depending on whether
m = m0 or m✄m0.
No new proofs guaranteed. Assume that m ∈ Tree. If Actm = ∅, then the
constraint is trivially satisfied. On the other hand, if Actm 6= ∅, then, by the Claim
above, we must have Actm = {x, y} and also that m✄m0&h ≈m0 h2 for some h ∈ Hm.
Therefore, we can choose an m′ ✄ m0 such that m
′ ∈ h2 ∩ h. But then m
′ must be
✂-comparable with m and we need to deal with the two cases:
Case 1. m ✂ m′. Then, by Lemma 2.2, h2 ∈ Hm. Recall that, by its choice,
h2 ∈ Hm1 , so that m must be ✂-comparable with m1 as well. By the Claim above,
we clearly have Act(m1, h2) = {x, y}, therefore, if m1 ✁m, then we are done. On the
other hand, if m ✂ m1, then, by (2), ¬Next(m0,m). The latter means that we can
choose an m′′ ✁m such that m′′ 5 m0. Hence by the absence of backward branching,
we will have m0 ✁m
′′. Note that by Lemma 2.2 and m′′ ✁m ✂m1 we will also have
h2 ∈ Hm′′ whence, by m0 ✁m′′, we get that Act(m′′, h2) = {x, y} again satisfying the
constraint.
Case 2. m′✁m. Then, sincem′✄m0 and h ≈m0 h2, we must haveAct(m
′, h) = {x, y}
thus satisfying the constraint.
Presented proofs are epistemically transparent. Assume that m,m′ ∈ Tree
are such that Re(m,m
′). Then, by definition of Re above, we will also have m ✂m
′.
Now, if Actm is empty, then the constraint is trivially verified. Otherwise we will
have Actm = {x, y} by the Claim above. Let h ∈ Hm′ be arbitrary. By Lemma 2.2,
h ∈ Hm, therefore Act(m,h) = {x, y}. But then, by the expansion of presented proofs
constraint (verified above) we must have Act(m′, h) = {x, y}. Since h ∈ Hm′ was
chosen arbitrarily, this shows that Actm′ = {x, y} and the constraint is satisfied.
Therefore, the above-defined M is shown to be a jstit model for Ag and by the
Claim above we obviously have that:
M,m0, h2 6|= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey)→ (Ex ∨ ¬Ey).
Indeed, whenever m′ ∈ Tree, then, by the Claim above, we will either have Actm′ = ∅
(and thenM,m′, g |= ¬✷Ey for all g ∈ Hm′), orActm′ = {x, y} (and thenM,m′, g |= ✷Ex
for all g ∈ Hm′). Therefore, it is clear that we have:
M,m0, h2 |= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey),
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and yet, on the other hand it is true that:
M,m0, h2 |= ¬Ex ∧ Ey.
The frame definability result for stit frames is now straightforward:
Theorem 2. Let C = 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉 be a stit frame for Ag. For any constant
specification CS it is true that:
(∀M ∈ModCS({C}))(M |= {A ∈ Form
Ag |⊢CS A})⇔ C ∈ C
Ag
mixsucc.
Proof. The (⇐)-part follows from Theorem 1. For the (⇒)-part, note that for a given
x, y ∈ PV ar we have
⊢CS K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey)→ (Ex ∨ ¬Ey)
by one application of (RD) to an appropriate instance of (A7). Given this fact, the
(⇒)-part follows from Lemma 5.
An analogous result for temporal frames is an easy corollary of the facts established
above. More precisely, we claim the following:
Corollary 2. Let CS be a constant specification and let T = 〈Tree,✂〉 be a temporal
frame outside T Agmixsucc. Then there is a CS-normal jstit modelM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
based on C such that for some (m,h) ∈MH(M) it is true that:
M,m, h 6|= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey)→ (Ex ∨ ¬Ey).
Proof. Just repeat the proof of Lemma 5 adding to the definition of M that we set
Choicemj = Hm for all m ∈ Tree and j ∈ Ag.
Now we can establish the following theorem in the same way as Theorem 2, using
Corollaries 1 and 2 instead of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5, respectively:
Theorem 3. Let T = 〈Tree,✂〉 be a temporal frame for Ag. For any constant speci-
fication CS it is true that:
(∀M ∈ModCS({T })(M |= {A ∈ Form
Ag |⊢CS A})⇔ T ∈ T
Ag
mixsucc.
3.2 Justification stit frames
We now turn to the much more complex case of jstit frames. First, we need to know
how ΣD(CS) stands in relation to the CS-normal models based on regular jstit frames,
and we start answering this question by establishing a soundness claim. This claim
mostly reduces to a routine check that every axiom is valid and that rules preserve
validity. We treat the less obvious cases in some detail:
Theorem 4. Let CS be an arbitrary constant specification. Then every instance
of (A0)–(A9) is valid over the class ModCS(FAgreg), and every application of rules
(R1),(R2),(RD), and (RCS) to formulas which are valid over ModCS(FAgreg) yields a
formula which is valid over the same class.
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Proof. First, note that if M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 is a CS-normal jstit
model based on a jstit frame from FAgreg, then 〈Tree,✂, Choice, V 〉 is a model of stit
logic. Therefore, axioms (A0)–(A3), which were copy-pasted from the standard axioma-
tization of dstit logic2 must be valid. Second, note that ifM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
is a CS-normal jstit model, then M = 〈Tree,R,Re, E , V 〉 is what is called in [2, Sec-
tion 6] a justification model with the form of constant specification given by CS3.
This means that also all of the (A4)–(A7) must be valid, whereas (R1), (R2), and
(RCS) must preserve validity, given that all these parts of our axiomatic system were
borrowed from the standard axiomatization of justification logic. The validity of
other parts of ΣD(CS) will be motivated below in some detail. In what follows,
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 will always stand for an arbitrary jstit model
in ModCS(FAgreg), and (m,h) for an arbitrary element of MH(M).
As for (A8), assume for reductio thatM,m, h |= KA∧✸K✸¬A. ThenM,m, h |= KA
and also M,m, h′ |= K✸¬A for some h′ ∈ Hm. By reflexivity of R, it follows that
✸¬A will be satisfied at (m,h) in M. The latter means that, for some h′′ ∈ Hm, A
must fail at (m,h′′) and therefore, again by reflexivity of R, KA must fail at (m,h) in
M, a contradiction.
We consider next (A9). If ✷Et is true at (m,h) inM, then, by definition, t ∈ Actm.
Now, ifm′ ∈ Tree is such that R(m,m′), then, by R ⊆ Re we will have Re(m,m′), and,
by the epistemic transparency of presented proofs constraint, we must have t ∈ Actm′
so that for every g ∈ Hm′ we will have M,m′, g |= ✷Et. Therefore, we must have
M,m, h |= K✷Et as well.
The hardest part is to show that (RD) preserves validity over jstit models from
ModCS(FAgreg). Assume that KA → (¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etn ∨ ✷Es1 ∨ . . . ∨ ✷Esk) is
valid over this class of jstit models, and assume also that we have:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ Et1 ∧ . . . ∧ Etn ∧ ¬Es1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Esk. (3)
By validity of (A1), it follows that:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ ¬✷Es1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬✷Esk.
Whence, by the assumed validity we know that also:
M,m, h |= ¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etn,
therefore, we can choose a natural u such that 1 ≤ u ≤ n and:
M,m, h |= ¬✷Etu.
The latter, in turn, means that for some h′ ∈ Hm we have that:
M,m, h′ |= ¬Etu. (4)
Comparison between (3) and (4) shows that Act(m,h) 6= Act(m,h′), whence by the
presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint we get that h 6≈m h′. Hence
2See, e.g. [4, Ch. 17], although Σ uses a simpler format closer to that given in [3, Section 2.3].
3The format for the variable assignment V is slightly different, but this is of no consequence for
the present setting.
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we know that m cannot be ✂-maximal in Tree. Using Lemma 2.1, we can choose in
Tree some m1 ✄m such that m1 ∈ h. We now establish the following claims:
Claim 1. (∀g ∈ Hm1)(h
′ 6≈m g).
The argument is the same as for h: if g ∈ Hm1 , then m1 ∈ g∩h so that, by m1✄m
we must have g ≈m h. But then, given Lemma 2.3 and h 6≈m h′, we cannot have
g ≈m h′.
Claim 2. S = {m′′ ∈ Tree | t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm′′} ∈ Θm′ for every m′ such that
m✁m′ ✂m1. Furthermore, m /∈ S.
The fact that m /∈ S immediately follows from (4). Now, choose in Tree an ar-
bitrary m′ such that m ✁ m′ ✂ m1. Since h ∈ Hm1 , we know, by Lemma 2.2, that
h ∈ Hm′ . Further, if g ∈ Hm′ is arbitrary, then, by the same lemma, g ∈ Hm. There-
fore, g ≈m h and, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint,
Act(m, g) = Act(m,h) ⊇ {t1, . . . , tn}. Whence, by m ✁m′ and the expansion of pre-
sented proofs constraints we get that {t1, . . . , tn} ⊆ Act(m′, g). Since g ∈ Hm′ was
chosen arbitrarily, this means that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm′ and hence m′ ∈ S thus verifying
Definition 2.1.
Next, if m2 ∈ S and Re(m2,m3), then t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm2 , hence by the epistemic
transparency of presented proofs t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm3 , which means that also m3 ∈ S
and Definition 2.2 is also verified.
Furthermore, assume that m2 ∈ Tree is such that, for all g ∈ Hm2 , there exists
mg ∈ g with the property Next(m2,mg)&mg ∈ S. So choose an arbitrary g ∈ Hm2 .
We have then t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actmg , whence, by the no new proofs guaranteed constraint
we can choose (m1g, h
1
g), . . . , (m
n
g , h
n
g ) such that:
h1g ∈ Hmg&m
1
g ✁mg&t1∈ Act(m
1
g, h
1
g);
. . .
hng ∈ Hmg&m
n
g ✁mg&tn∈ Act(m
n
g , h
n
g ).
(5)
By Next(m2,mg) and (5) we get that:
m1g, . . . ,m
n
g ✂m2. (6)
From g, h1g, . . . , h
n
g ∈ Hmg , m2 ✁mg, and Lemma 2.2 we get that:
h1g, . . . , h
n
g ∈ Hm2 . (7)
and, further:
h1g ≈m2 g, . . . , h
n
g ≈m2 g. (8)
By the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, this further means
that:
Act(m2, h
1
g) = . . . = Act(m2, h
n
g ) = Act(m2, g). (9)
Next, by (6), (7), the expansion of presented proofs constraint, and (5) we get that:
t1 ∈ Act(m2, h
1
g), . . . , tn ∈ Act(m2, h
n
g ). (10)
It follows now from (9) and (10) that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Act(m2, g). Since g ∈ Hm2 was
chosen arbitrarily, this further means that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm2 and thus m2 ∈ S, as
desired. In this way, Definition 2.3 is verified.
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Now, let m2 ∈ S and assume that:
(∀m3 ✁m2)∃m4(m3 ✁m4 ✁m2). (11)
By m2 ∈ S we know that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm2 . Again, by the no new proofs guaranteed
constraint we can choose (m1, h1), . . . , (mn, hn) such that:
h1 ∈ Hm2&m
1 ✁m2&t1∈ Act(m
1, h1);
. . .
hn ∈ Hm2&m
n ✁m2&tn∈ Act(mn, hn).
(12)
By (12) and the absence of backward branching it follows that all of m1, . . . ,mn are
✂-comparable, so we let m′ be the ✂-greatest moment among m1, . . . ,mn. By the
choice of m′ and (12), we have:
m′ ✁m2. (13)
Therefore, by Lemma 2.2, we get Hm2 ⊆ Hm′ , whence:
h1, . . . , hn ∈ Hm′ . (14)
It follows then from (12) and (13) that:
h1 ≈m′ . . . ≈m′ h
n, (15)
which further means, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint
that:
Act(m′, h1) = . . . = Act(m′, hn). (16)
Again by the choice of m′ and the expansion of presented proofs constraint, we further
get that:
t1 ∈ Act(m
′, h1), . . . , tn ∈ Act(m
′, hn). (17)
It follows then from (17) and (16) that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Act(m′, h1). Now, by (11) and
(13), we can choose an m′′ ∈ Tree such that m′ ✁ m′′ ✁ m2. By Lemma 2.2, we
know that Hm2 ⊆ Hm′′ , whence, by (12), h
1 ∈ Hm′′ . It follows, by Lemma 3, that
t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm′′ and thus m′′ ∈ S, as desired. This ends both the verification of
Definition 2.4 and the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3. (∀m′1 ∈ h
′)(Next(m,m′1)⇒ m
′
1 /∈ S).
Indeed, assume the contrary, i.e. that for some m′1 ∈ h
′ we have both Next(m,m′1)
and m′1 ∈ S. Then we will have t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm′1 . But then, by the no new proofs
guaranteed constraint, we can choose a g ∈ Hm′
1
andm′′✁m′1 such that tu ∈ Act(m
′′, g).
By Next(m,m′1) we know that m
′′ ✂m and by Lemma 2.2 and m′1 ✄m we know that
g ∈ Hm. Therefore, by the expansion of presented proofs, we get that tu ∈ Act(m, g).
Moreover, note that m′1 ∈ h
′ ∩ g so that h′ ≈m g. Therefore, by the presenting a
new proof makes histories divide constraint, we must have Act(m,h′) = Act(m, g) ∋ tu
which is in plain contradiction with (4).
In view of the Claims 1–3 above, we must be able to choose an m2 ∈ Tree such
that both m2✂m1 and Next(m,m2). So we consider such an m2. Given that m1 ∈ h,
we know, by Lemma 2.2, that h ∈ Hm2 . Therefore, it follows from (3) and Lemma 3
that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Actm2 , or, equivalently:
M,m2, h |= ✷Et1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Etn. (18)
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Furthermore, by the future always matters constraint we know that R(m,m2), whence
it follows, again by (3), that:
M,m2, h |= KA. (19)
Finally, choose an arbitrary r between 1 and k. If sr ∈ Actm2 , then, by the no new
proofs guaranteed constraint, there must be some g ∈ Hm2 and some m0 ✁ m such
that sr ∈ Act(m0, g). Then, by Lemma 2.2, g ∈ Hm, hence h ≈m g. Therefore, by the
presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, Act(m, g) = Act(m,h). By
Next(m,m2) we must have m0 ✂m, therefore, by the expansion of presented proofs,
sr ∈ Act(m, g), whence also sr ∈ Act(m,h). But this plainly contradicts (3). Since
1 ≤ r ≤ k was chosen arbitrarily, this means that all of s1, . . . , sk are outside Actm2 so
that we have:
M,m2, h |= ¬✷Es1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬✷Esk. (20)
Taken together, (18)–(20) contradict the assumed validity of
KA→ (¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etn ∨ ✷Es1 ∨ . . . ∨ ✷Esk).
It follows from Theorem 4 that we cannot have a result analogous to Theorem 2
w.r.t. jstit frames. Indeed, by Lemma 4.2, there exists a regular jstit frame F for Ag,
which violates condition (mixsucc). However, by Theorem 4, every CS-normal jstit
model based on F will make every theorem of ΣD(CS) valid. Therefore, the frame
definability result for jstit frames has to use a much more involved regularity condition
in place of (mixsucc).
Even though Theorem 4 is already sufficient to derive the frame definability theorem
for jstit frames, we pause to observe that one can actually get a completeness theorem
as well:
Theorem 5. Let Γ ⊆ FormAg and let F be a class of jstit frames such that FAgreg ↓⊆ F ⊆ F
Ag
reg.
Then Γ is CS-consistent iff it is satisfiable in ModCS(F).
Proof. (⇒). Let Γ ⊆ FormAg be satisfiable inModCS(F) so that for someM∈ModCS(F)
and some (m,h) ∈MH(M) we haveM,m, h |= Γ. Then we must haveM ∈ModCS(FAgreg).
If Γ were CS-inconsistent, this would mean that for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we would
have ⊢CS (A1 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ ⊥. By Theorem 4, this would mean that:
M,m, h |= (A1 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ ⊥,
whence clearlyM,m, h |= ⊥, which is impossible. Therefore, Γ must be CS-consistent.
(⇐). We can re-use the canonical model MAgCS from Part I of this paper. In Part
I, MAgCS was shown to be CS-universal in that it satisfies every CS-consistent subset of
FormAg. It was also shown that MAgCS ∈ Mod
↓
CS(C
Ag
mixsucc), whence, by Lemma 4.1,
we get that MAgCS is in ModCS(F
Ag
reg ↓) and therefore in F .
Now for the frame definability for jstit frames:
Lemma 6. CS be a constant specification and let F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, R,Re〉 be a
jstit frame outside FAgreg. Then there is a CS-normal jstit modelM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
based on F such that for some (m,h) ∈MH(M) it is true that:
M,m, h 6|= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey)→ (Ex ∨ ¬Ey).
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Proof. Assume that F /∈ FAgreg. Then we can choose m0,m1 ∈ Tree, h
′ ∈ Hm0 , and
S ∈
⋂
m0✁m✂m1
Θm such that:
(m0 ✁m1)&m0 /∈ S&(∀g ∈ Hm1)(g 6≈m0 h
′)&
&(∀m′ ∈ h′)(Next(m0,m
′)⇒ m′ /∈ S)&(∀m✂m1)(¬Next(m0,m)). (21)
We now extend F to M setting E(m, t) = FormAg for all m ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol, and
setting V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ V ar. As for Act, we set as follows. We first choose an
arbitrary h2 ∈ Hm1 . By Lemma 2.2 we know that also h2 ∈ Hm0 . Now for an arbitrary
m ∈ Tree we define that:
Act(m,h) =


{y}, if m = m0 and h ≈m0 h2;
{x, y}, if m ∈ S ∨ ∃m′(m′ ∈ h ∩ S&Next(m,m′));
∅, otherwise.
It is obvious that every semantical constraint on jstit models is satisfied, except possibly
for the constraints invoking Act, and it is also clear that such an M satisfies CS-
normality condition for every possible constant specification CS.
As for Act itself, we start by establishing the following claims:
Claim 1. (∀m ∈ Tree)(m ∈ S ⇔ Actm = {x, y}).
Indeed, whenever m ∈ S, we will have Act(m,h) = {x, y} for every h ∈ Hm and
hence Actm = {x, y}. In the other direction, assume that for every h ∈ Hm it is true
that Act(m,h) = {x, y}. If m ∈ S, then we are done. If m /∈ S, then for every h ∈ Hm
we must have an mh ∈ h such that both mh ∈ S and Next(m,mh). But then, by
Definition 2.3, we must also have m ∈ S despite our initial assumption.
Claim 2. (∀m ∈ Tree)(Actm = ∅ ∨ Actm = {x, y}).
Indeed, if m 6= m0 then for every h ∈ Hm we will have either Act(m,h) = ∅ or
Act(m,h) = {x, y} just by definition of Act so that the claim is obviously true. And if
m = m0. then we know that Act(m0, h
′) = ∅ so that we must have Actm0 = ∅.
Claim 3. Under the settings for M we have, for an arbitrary m ∈ Tree:
Actm =
{
{x, y}, m ∈ S;
∅, otherwise.
Immediate from Claims 1 and 2.
Claim 4. (∀m ∈ Tree)((m ∈ h2&m✄m0)⇒ m ∈ S).
Indeed, if m ∈ h2, then m must be ✂-comparable to m1. Now, if m ✂ m1, then
m0✁m✂m1 so that m ∈ S by Definition 2.1. On the other hand, if m1✁m, then note
that we clearly havem1 ∈ S by Definition 2.1. By the future always matters constraint
and R ⊆ Re we further get Re(m1,m), whence by Definition 2.2 we again get m ∈ S.
We now look into the semantical constraints dependent on Act in some detail.
Expansion of presented proofs. Assume that m ✁m′ and h ∈ Hm′ . We have
three cases to consider.
Case 1. Act(m,h) = ∅. The constraint is verified trivially.
Case 2. Act(m,h) = {y}. Then m = m0 and h ≈m0 h2. The latter means that we
can choose an m′′ ✄m = m0 such that m
′′ ∈ h ∩ h2. By Claim 4, we get then that
m′′ ∈ S. Now, since also m′ ∈ h, m′ and m′′ must be ✂-comparable. If m′′ ✁m′, then
Re(m
′′,m′) by the future always matters constraint and R ⊆ Re, and, further, m′ ∈ S
by Definition 2.2. If m′ ✂m′′ then by Lemma 2.2, we get that m′ ∈ h2 and since also
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m′✄m = m0, this means that m
′ ∈ S by Claim 4. Thus we get m′ ∈ S anyway, which
means that Act(m′, h) = {x, y} and the constraint is satisfied.
Case 3. Act(m,h) = {x, y}. If m ∈ S then also m′ ∈ S by R ⊆ Re, the future
always matters constraint, and Definition 2.2. On the other hand, if there existsm′′ ∈ h
such that m′′ ∈ S&Next(m,m′′), then m′ and m′′ are both in h and must be ✂-
comparable. We cannot have m′ ✁ m′′ since by Next(m,m′′) this would mean that
m′ ✂ m, in contradiction with our assumptions. Therefore, we must have m′′ ✂ m′,
whence by R ⊆ Re, the future always matters constraint, and Definition 2.2 we again
get that m′ ∈ S. Thus we get m′ ∈ S anyway, which means that Act(m′, h) = {x, y}
and the constraint is satisfied.
Presenting a new proof makes histories divide. Assume that h, g ∈ Hm and
that there exists an m′ ✄m such that m′ ∈ g ∩ h. We consider four cases according to
the above definition of Act:
Case 1. m ∈ S. Then clearly Act(m,h) = Act(m, g) = {x, y} and the constraint is
satisfied.
Case 2. For some m′′ ∈ h it is true that m′′ ∈ S and Next(m,m′′). Then
Act(m,h) = {x, y}, and also m′ and m′′ must be ✂-comparable. We cannot have
m′ ✁m′′ since by Next(m,m′′) this would mean that m′ ✂m, in contradiction with
our assumptions. Therefore, we must have m′′ ✂m′, whence by Lemma 2.2, we must
have m′′ ∈ g so that we get Act(m, g) = {x, y} as well, and the constraint is satisfied.
A symmetrical (and similar) subcase would start from the assumption that m′′ ∈ g.
Case 3. m = m0 and h ≈m0 h2. Then Act(m,h) = {y}. By Lemma 2.3, we get
that g ≈m0 h2 so that Act(m, g) = {y} as well, and the constraint is satisfied. Again,
a symmetrical (and similar) subcase would start from the assumption that g ≈m0 h2.
Case 4. None of the above cases applies either for h or for g. ThenAct(m,h) = Act(m, g) = ∅
and the constraint is satisfied.
No new proofs guaranteed. Let m ∈ Tree be arbitrary. If Actm = ∅, then the
constraint is satisfied trivially. On the other hand, if Actm 6= ∅, then, by Claim 3, we
must have both m ∈ S and Actm = {x, y}. Then we have to consider two cases:
Case 1. There exists an m′ ✁ m such that m′ ∈ S. Then choose an arbitrary
h ∈ Hm. We have m′ ∈ h by Lemma 2.2, and Act(m′, h) = {x, y} by the above
definition of Act, so that the constraint is satisfied.
Case 2. For all m′ ✁m we have m′ /∈ S. Then, by Definition 2.4 we must have:
(∃m2 ✁m)(∀m3 ✁m)(¬m2 ✁m3).
We choose such an m2. Of course, whenever m3✁m, m3 must be ✂-comparable to m2
by the absence of backward branching, therefore, given that we never have m2 ✁m3,
we must get that:
(∀m3 ✁m)(m3 ✂m2).
Adding this up with m2 ✁ m, we get that Next(m2,m). Now, choose an arbitrary
h ∈ Hm. We have m2 ∈ h by Lemma 2.2 and Act(m2, h) = {x, y} by the fact that
m ∈ h ∩ S&Next(m2,m) and the above definition of Act, so that the constraint is
again satisfied.
Presented proofs are epistemically transparent. Assume that m,m′ ∈ Tree
are such that Re(m,m
′). Then, if Actm = ∅, the constraint is satisfied trivially. On
the other hand, if Actm 6= ∅, then, by Claim 3, we must have m ∈ S. But then, by
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Definition 2.2, we will also have m′ ∈ S, and, by Claim 3, Actm′ = Actm = {x, y} so
that the constraint is again satisfied.
Therefore, the above-definedM is shown to be a jstit model for Ag and we obviously
have that:
M,m0, h2 6|= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey)→ (Ex ∨ ¬Ey).
Indeed, whenever m′ ∈ Tree, then, by Claim 2 above, we will either have Actm′ = ∅
(and thenM,m′, g |= ¬✷Ey for all g ∈ Hm′), orActm′ = {x, y} (and thenM,m
′, g |= ✷Ex
for all g ∈ Hm′). Therefore, it is clear that we have:
M,m0, h2 |= K(✷Ex ∨ ¬✷Ey),
and yet, on the other hand it is true that:
M,m0, h2 |= ¬Ex ∧ Ey.
The frame definability result for jstit frames is now also straightforward:
Theorem 6. Let F = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, R,Re〉 be a jstit frame for Ag. For any con-
stant specification CS it is true that:
(∀M ∈ModCS({F}))(M |= {A ∈ Form
Ag |⊢CS A})⇔ F ∈ F
Ag
reg.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 2, using Theorem 5 and Lemma 6 in place of Theorem 1
and Lemma 5, respectively.
4 Conclusions and further research
We have established that ΣD, our axiomatization of stit logic of justification an-
nouncements from Part I, has a reasonably clear-cut meaning (given by condition
(mixsucc) in Definition 1 above) when it comes to restrictions induced by it on the
temporal substructure of the underlying frame. The fact that ΣD, as it follows from
the main result of Part I, cannot distinguish between mixed successor frames and a
group of other stronger restrictions all the way up to discrete time structures under-
scores the limitations of expressive power of JA-STIT. We have also seen that once
the epistemic accessibility relations enter the picture, the complexity of the restriction
on frames imposed by ΣD goes up significantly. One may even question the possible
utility of such a complex defining condition as an insight into the nature of JA-STIT.
We believe, however, that the notion of the family of sets Θm for a given moment is
interesting at least in that the claims we have established in the course of proofs of
Theorems 4 and 6 given above apparently suggest that these families allow one to more
or less characterize, for a given finite set of proof polynomials σ, the set of moments m
in a given jstit model for which we have σ ⊆ Actm without mentioning Act at all. This
by-product of the above results probably holds some potential for further research in
this direction.
Additionally, the above results lay down a basis for similar enquiries into the ex-
pressive powers of some natural extensions of JA-STIT, like the logic of E-notions (see
[8]) or the full basic jstit logic introduced in [7].
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